During monitoring of the Slovak information space, the Institute’s team identified a publication on the Pravda.sk blog containing an alleged transcript of a conversation between Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár and the Russian ambassador. The authenticity of the document cannot be verified; however, its formatting corresponds to typical materials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the content does not appear incidental: the lifting of restrictions on cultural cooperation with Russia was accompanied by statements from the Russian side about the possible return of the “Russian House”, while official contacts included discussions on energy, intergovernmental cooperation, and cultural engagement. Taken together, this points to a consistent trajectory toward the gradual normalization of Slovak–Russian relations.
Any contacts with the Russian ambassador under the current circumstances cannot be regarded as a neutral diplomatic gesture. After Russia’s full-scale invasion, its systematic violation of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, as well as its years-long campaign of disinformation and political influence in Europe, such contacts do not signify “pragmatism,” but rather the normalization of an aggressor state and tolerance of its messaging. It is particularly revealing that the transmitted record of the conversation of March 10, 2026, between the Russian ambassador to Slovakia, S. Andreyev, and Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Juraj Blanár, indicates that it was the Slovak minister himself who proactively began the conversation with the subject of the war against Ukraine. The EU explicitly proceeds from the premise that Russia’s actions continue to violate fundamental norms of international law, in particular the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
When representatives of the political or cultural sphere in an EU and NATO member state allow themselves such contacts with representatives of the Russian regime, they are in effect presenting international law as something optional, situational, and capable of being set aside “for the sake of conversation.” This is the most dangerous signal of all. Because this is no longer simply about diplomatic etiquette, but about undermining the very idea of a rules-based international order. On this basis, the conviction grows that war crimes, occupation, deportations, nuclear blackmail, and information operations are not obstacles to “business as usual.” The record of the conversation reveals something even more alarming: Blanár did not merely listen to the Russian position; according to the record, he “assured that Robert Fico’s government understands the reasons that prompted Russia to begin the special military operation in February 2022.” Such wording leaves no room for any “neutral” interpretations; it amounts to a clear adoption of Russia’s imperialist position and a direct justification of aggressive war.
A separate threat is posed by the activity of structures such as Rossotrudnichestvo, raised in the conversation, which can no longer be perceived as an ordinary cultural instrument. The European Parliament has directly described the offices of Russkiy Dom / Russian House, financed by the sanctioned Russian federal agency Rossotrudnichestvo, as hubs whose deceptive projects spread disinformation, propaganda, and the Kremlin’s agenda among EU civil society. Analysts at EUvsDisinfo also identify Rossotrudnichestvo as part of a state-controlled ecosystem designed to shape the information environment for Moscow’s foreign policy goals, as well as to work with Russian-speaking communities abroad. In this context, it is particularly telling that the same conversation specifically addressed the legal status of the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bratislava, and that, according to the record, the minister stated that this matter had been assigned to staff of the relevant departments of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while also agreeing to the creation of a working group involving representatives of the ministry and the Russian embassy.
That is precisely why Rossotrudnichestvo is not “cultural diplomacy” in the usual sense. It is an instrument of penetration, the recruitment of loyalty, the legitimisation of Kremlin narratives, and the creation of a social foothold for influence, particularly through work with Russian-speaking communities and networks of “compatriots.” In Europe, Russian Houses continue to operate even after sanctions against the parent structure; journalistic investigations describe them as centres of Kremlin soft power that often exist in a legal gray zone, maintain close ties to Russian embassies, and in certain countries have become the subject of investigations due to suspicions that they provide cover for intelligence activity. That is precisely the problem: where some see “cultural exchange,” security services increasingly see a channel of influence, manipulation, and potential information gathering. The transmitted document makes clear that this is not about abstract dialogue, but about practical assistance in resolving the status of the Russian Centre for Science and Culture, restoring its functioning, and synchronizing this issue with the interstate agenda.
Therefore, contacts with a representative of a state that the Alliance itself and European institutions view as a source of systemic threat harm not only information security. They call security as such into question. Sauli Niinistö’s report for the European Commission directly emphasizes that hostile intelligence services exploit divergences in counterintelligence practices among member states and that the EU must make their work on its territory more difficult. In such a context, any “informality” or political leniency toward representatives of the Russian Federation is not a minor episode, but a systemic vulnerability that Moscow has traditionally exploited. The content of the conversation indicates that Blanár also called the EU’s anti-Russian restrictions “senseless,” confirmed Slovakia’s intention to challenge before the Court of Justice of the EU the decision to ban imports of Russian gas from 2027, and characterized the cessation of Russian oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline as “blackmail and pressure” by Ukraine. This is no longer simply “contact” — it is the granting of additional political legitimacy to the Russian agenda within the European Union.
This is a vivid example of FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) in action. The European External Action Service defines FIMI as a set of tactics of external manipulation and interference in the information space, and its latest reports directly indicate that Russia remains the main source of such operations against the EU and its partners. FIMI works not only through fakes and anonymous Telegram channels, but also through the authority of an embassy, through “cultural” structures, through indirect influence networks, and through the creation of the illusion that the Russian position is “one of the legitimate points of view,” rather than an instrument of war against Europe. This exact pattern is visible here as well: a diplomatic channel, an energy storyline, an attack on the EU’s sanctions logic, the delegitimization of Ukraine’s position as alleged “pressure,” and the parallel promotion of the interests of Russian influence infrastructure in Slovakia. Taken together, all of this allows us to assert that Blanár’s conversation with the Russian ambassador is not ordinary diplomatic work, but an element, a step toward expanding the ecosystem of Russian influence.
Against this backdrop, the condition of freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and cultural autonomy in Slovakia itself is especially alarming. The Media Freedom Rapid Response mission documented a deterioration in media freedom in the country, growing media capture, the spread of disinformation, and threats to journalists’ safety. In its 2025 Rule of Law chapter on Slovakia, the European Commission also refers to these conclusions and separately emphasizes that media freedom and media pluralism are central to the rule of law. In such an environment, any rapprochement between the political leadership and Russian diplomatic and quasi-cultural structures constitutes a double threat: on the one hand, to the state’s information resilience, and on the other, to society’s ability to recognize external influence in a timely manner.
Therefore, the issue is no longer only about individual contacts or individual signals. The issue is that the current Slovak authorities are consciously harming European unity, security, and the democratic resilience of their own state. If state actors or actors close to the authorities simultaneously normalize contacts with representatives of the Russian regime, open space for Russian influence networks, and weaken the environment of free speech, this inevitably raises a broader question: to what extent does such practice correspond to the basic principles on which the European Union stands — democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities. It is precisely these principles that the EU defines as the core of the Copenhagen criteria. The record indicates that this is not merely about an exchange of remarks: it also records an intention to restore the work of the bilateral intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific-technical cooperation, intensify contacts on issues related to military memorial themes, and resolve a number of practical matters important for the Russian presence in Slovakia. This already looks like a systematic reinstitutionalization of relations with an aggressor state.
Today, the silent legitimization of Russian influence — and in Minister Blanár’s case, a very loud one — is not a “sovereign position” or an “alternative opinion,” but political irresponsibility with direct consequences for Europe’s security. And every such meeting, every gesture of indulgence toward the Russian embassy, every attempt to shield propaganda instruments with words about “culture” or “dialogue” only brings closer the moment when the question will have to be posed directly: is Mr. Blanár making mistakes because of his own lack of professionalism, or is he knowingly acting according to a logic that benefits the state that destroyed lasting peace in Europe — Russia?