Digest of news from Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland, July 21 - July 27, 2025

Slovakia

Key news to follow:

1. Every seventh Slovak resident supports joining Russia
2. The country cites "economic feasibility" by fully switching to Russian gas in 2026


Analysis: The results of the sociological study in Slovakia reveal a disturbing trend of European identity erosion among segments of the population. The fact that 14% of respondents unequivocally support joining Russia, with another 18% considering such a possibility, indicates a deep crisis of trust in Western institutions and the effectiveness of Russian propaganda. Particularly concerning is that students and unemployed individuals emerged as the most active supporters of this idea - precisely those social strata who will shape the country's future. This demonstrates the failure of Slovakia's educational system in fostering critical thinking and European identity.

Meanwhile, the decision by Slovak state company SPP to completely transition to Russian gas in 2026 confirms official Bratislava's readiness to ignore the EU's strategic interests for short-term economic gains. While Slovakia formally operates within exemptions granted by Brussels, this position demonstrates a lack of solidarity with union partners and unwillingness to bear the costs of energy source diversification. Arguments about economic feasibility cannot justify financing Russia's military machine through energy payments, especially in the context of aggression against Ukraine.

IESS believes that the combination of these two trends - growing pro-Russian sentiments among the population and energy dependence on Moscow - creates a dangerous precedent for other EU members. Robert Fico's policy of rejecting the REPowerEU initiative and statements about the benefits of neutral status for Slovakia effectively undermine the unity of the European response to Russian aggression. We predict that without decisive action from European institutions and Slovak civil society, this country could become the first case of successful "state capture" by Russia through democratic procedures, posing an existential threat to the entire European project.

Czech Republic

Key news to follow:

1. Country almost doubled its arms exports, primarily thanks to Ukraine
2. Volunteers raise $2.4 million for howitzers for Ukraine


Analysis: The near doubling of Czech arms exports in 2024, reaching 91 billion crowns, demonstrates a fundamental transformation of Prague's military-industrial policy under the influence of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The fact that the Ukrainian direction accounted for more than half of total Czech weapons exports (47.1 billion crowns) indicates a strategic reorientation of the Czech defense industry from traditional partners toward supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile, the 130% increase in the country's own arms imports points to active strengthening of the Czech Republic's own defense capabilities amid the deteriorating security situation in the region.

Assessing these indicators, the Institute notes the positive dynamics of Czech defense industry integration into pan-European efforts to support Ukraine, which strengthens the EU's strategic autonomy in defense. However, Prague's decision not to participate in the US program for purchasing American weapons for Ukraine through NATO may signal an attempt to preserve its own industrial priorities, which is quite understandable from the perspective of national interests, though it could potentially create certain coordination challenges within transatlantic cooperation.

The civic initiative "Gift for Putin," which raised 60 million crowns for howitzers for the Ukrainian army, illustrates a unique model of people's diplomacy and civilian support that has emerged in the Czech Republic. The total sum of over one billion crowns raised by the initiative since May 2022 transforms this project into the most successful example of crowdfunding military aid in Europe. Such mobilization of Czech society reflects citizens' deep understanding of the existential nature of the threat that Russian imperialism poses to the entire Central and Eastern European region.

IESS anticipates that the combination of state and public support for Ukraine from the Czech Republic will create additional pressure on other European countries to strengthen their own efforts. The Czech model of people's diplomacy could become an example for other EU member states where public opinion also supports providing aid to Ukraine. At the same time, the growth of Czech defense exports will contribute to strengthening the technological base of European defense industry and reducing dependence on American supplies, which aligns with the EU's strategic goals of achieving defense autonomy.
 

Poland

Key news to follow:

1. The nationalist opposition is already significantly ahead of the ruling party
2. Why Donald Tusk is renewing the Polish government


Analysis: The rise in support for "Law and Justice" to 28% compared to 24% for the ruling "Civic Coalition" of Donald Tusk demonstrates a massive political comeback of conservative forces in Poland. Particularly alarming is the third place of the anti-Ukrainian "Confederation" with 14% support, indicating deepening populist sentiments among part of Polish society. Such trends create real risks for the stability of Warsaw's pro-Ukrainian policy, especially in the context of the upcoming inauguration of President Karol Nawrocki, who represents the "PiS" camp and may actively block current government initiatives.

The redistribution of political forces occurs against the backdrop of internal problems within Tusk's coalition, as evidenced by protracted negotiations over government restructuring and secret meetings between individual coalition leaders and the opposition. We suspect that instability in Warsaw could have serious consequences for Ukrainian diplomacy, as Poland remains Ukraine's key advocate in the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, the appointment of Radosław Sikorski as deputy prime minister while retaining his foreign ministry portfolio may ensure certain continuity in foreign policy despite internal turbulence.

Particular attention is drawn to Tusk's strategy of forming a "government of revenge," focused on persecuting the previous government through the appointment of Waldemar Żurek as justice minister and the return of Marcin Kierwiński to the interior ministry. While such tactics may mobilize the liberal electorate, they simultaneously risk deepening polarization of Polish society and diverting the government from strategic tasks, including support for Ukraine. The retention of Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz as defense minister raises concerns, given his previous unfriendly statements about Ukraine and reports of blocking F-16 transfers.

Assessing the current situation, IESS notes an escalation of the internal political crisis in Poland, which could lead to a change in course toward Ukraine after the 2027 elections. The growing popularity of "PiS" and "Confederation" signals a possible return to a more cautious or even skeptical position regarding Ukrainian interests. Under these conditions, Ukraine should diversify its diplomatic efforts and strengthen relations with other European partners, not relying exclusively on Polish support. It also becomes critically important to prevent Ukrainian-Polish disagreements on historical issues from again becoming tools of internal political struggle in Warsaw.