Key news to follow:
1. Fico to Costa: "The EU cannot place Ukraine's interests above Slovakia's"
2. Threats of "further measures" and hints at blocking the loan package for Kyiv
Analysis:
On 16 March, during a 45-minute call with European Council President António Costa, the Slovak prime minister stated outright that Brussels has no right to subordinate the interests of member states to those of Ukraine – framing the suspension of Druzhba as "purely political" in nature. In parallel, Hungary and Slovakia pushed for a separate discussion of the pipeline at the EU Council, where Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijjártó confirmed that Budapest would block any decision favourable to Kyiv until Druzhba was restored. The outcome of the European Council on 19 March codified a new fault line: the conclusions on Ukraine were signed by 25 of 27 leaders, without Orbán and Fico.
On 19 March, Fico escalated further, declaring a "state of emergency in oil supply" and threatening "further measures against Ukraine" unless Zelenskyi restored transit. Even more telling was his interview on 21 March, in which he openly defended Orbán, called him "politically right," and explicitly floated the possibility that Slovakia might also block the EU's €90 billion loan package for Ukraine. A separate detail: Fico explained his refusal to travel to Kyiv by saying he had no wish to be a "suicide case."
The internal logic of this escalation deserves attention. Fico is running his own dual-pressure tactic against both Kyiv and Brussels, opportunistically synchronising with Budapest wherever it yields domestic political returns. The appeal to Slovakia's "right" to Russian oil until 2027 is a legally fragile construction, but a rhetorically convenient one before his own electorate. At the same time, his actual readiness to block the loan remains an open question: the cost of an open confrontation with Brussels is structurally higher for Bratislava than for Budapest, and Fico is acutely aware of this. The veto threat, however, is rather a negotiating instrument than an announcement of irreversible strategic intent.
Key news to follow:
1. The Foreign Ministry disbanded its sanctions and Russian-influence department
2. Arson attack on a drone manufacturer supplying Ukraine in Pardubice – likely hybrid sabotage
3. Mass rally in Prague: up to 250,000 against the Babiš government
Analysis:
Three Czech stories this week, taken together, compose a troubling and contradictory picture.
On 17 March, it emerged that the Department for Sanctions, Cyberspace Protection and Resilience, which was established under the previous government specifically to counter covert Russian influence, had quietly disappeared from the Foreign Ministry. The official website still lists it. Security sources have already warned that the move will degrade Prague's ability to respond effectively to penetration through diplomatic channels, particularly given that Foreign Minister Macinka has yet to bring to the cabinet the proposed entry-control measures for Russian diplomats, promised since January.
Against that backdrop, on the evening of 20 March, a fire broke out at a facility in Pardubice belonging to LPP Holding, which produces, among other things, the Divoká Svině drones supplied to Ukraine. Responsibility was claimed by an obscure group calling itself the "Earthquake Faction," by invoking "cooperation in weapon production with Israeli company Elbit Systems" as its justification. Former military intelligence chief Andor Šandor publicly declined to rule out a Russian false-flag operation: the reference to a conflict that has been out of its hot phase for three years strikes many analysts as conspicuously contrived. It is notable that the first such attack on defence manufacturing occurred precisely at the moment the Foreign Ministry dismantled the unit designed to track such operations.
A sharply different register was set by the rally on 21 March at Letenské náměstí in Prague, where organisers counted approximately 250,000 participants under the banner "We Will Not Let Them Steal Our Future" – the third wave of mass protest since the start of 2026. Czech society is sending a sustained and organised signal that Babiš's course toward the narrowing of civic space and the oligarchisation of the state will not pass without resistance. The internal fracture of Czech democracy – between a president gravitating toward liberal European norms and a government systematically borrowing from the illiberal playbook – shows no sign of easing. While these two forces continue to offset one another, the equilibrium between them appears increasingly fragile.
Key news to follow:
1. Sikorski flags a warning signal: Trump says "they" about NATO, not "we"
2. Warsaw court approves the extradition of Russian archaeologist Butyagin
Analysis:
On the margins of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 16 March, Minister Sikorski highlighted a detail easy to miss amid the noise of Washington's louder declarations: the American president speaks of NATO in the third person, distancing himself from the Alliance. For Poland, which spends over 4% of GDP on defence and anchors its entire security doctrine around Article 5, this is not a rhetorical footnote but a matter of strategic recalibration. Sikorski confirmed that Warsaw will not participate in any mission around the Strait of Hormuz, a position clearly marked out by President Nawrocki as well, demonstrating a rare moment of alignment in Poland's otherwise fractious domestic landscape.
The second story is legal in nature but potentially far-reaching in effect. On 18 March, the Warsaw District Court approved Ukraine's extradition request for Russian archaeologist Alexander Butyagin, who is charged with conducting illegal excavations on occupied Ukrainian territory and causing nearly 200 million hryvnias in damage to cultural heritage. The decision is not yet final – the defence intends to appeal, and the ultimate call rests with Justice Minister Bodnar. However, the fact that a Polish court has affirmed the legal validity of extraditing an individual for crimes related to the destruction of heritage on occupied territory establishes a precedent. Should the extradition proceed, it may serve as a warning to all those who have until now considered participation in Moscow-sponsored academic projects on occupied lands a legally safe zone.
IESS reads both developments as symptomatic: the first underscores that Polish strategic culture demands reliability from the United States in operational conduct; the second demonstrates that Warsaw is prepared to deploy legal mechanisms as an autonomous instrument of pressure on Moscow, even when doing so generates diplomatic friction.