Digest of news from Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland, October 13 - October 19, 2025

Slovakia

Key news to follow:

1. Fico says he wants good relations with everyone, including Russia
2. Slovakia's opposition accuses a pro-Russian organization of creating an intelligence network
3. How Russian energy still reaches the EU and how Brussels plans to stop it


Analysis: Robert Fico's statement about wanting "good relations with everyone," including Russia, once again demonstrates the consistent erosion of Slovak foreign policy. The Slovak premier attempts to disguise his overtly pro-Russian orientation with rhetoric about pragmatism and multi-vectoralism, when in reality we're witnessing a systematic drift away from the consolidated European position. This sounds particularly cynical considering Bratislava's readiness to provide "any assistance" to Hungary in organizing a Trump-Putin meeting, effectively legitimizing the Russian dictator as an equal partner. Fico's open desire to restore full ties with Moscow during a full-scale aggression against Ukraine exposes the true nature of his "multi-vectoralism" – this isn't diplomatic flexibility but a betrayal of fundamental principles of European solidarity and transatlantic unity.

Meanwhile, the situation with the pro-Russian organization “Brat za brata”, which is building its own "intelligence network" to collect data on "enemies of the people," points to far more dangerous processes within Slovakia. The fact that a structure that grew out of Putin's "Night Wolves" cell can build parallel structures with signs of intimidation and surveillance with impunity suggests that Slovak security services have either lost control of the situation or are consciously allowing it to happen. We assess that the inaction of Interior Minister Šutaj Eštok in this situation raises serious questions about Bratislava's ability to protect its own national security. This is no longer just about rhetoric or political statements – it concerns a real threat to the country's democratic institutions when pro-Russian structures receive a de facto carte blanche to create alternative power mechanisms.

The role of Slovakia and Hungary in financing Russian aggression through continued oil imports despite the European embargo deserves separate assessment. The fact that these two countries annually pour 4.1 billion euros into the Kremlin's military budget exposes the true face of their "sovereign" policy. Bratislava and Budapest haven't simply received an exemption from the sanctions regime – they've turned it into an instrument for directly financing the war against Ukraine. The RePowerEU plan, which envisions canceling this exemption from January 1, 2026, could become a moment of truth for these countries. The question is whether Brussels will have the political will to push these decisions through resistance from the powerful gas lobby and sabotage from Slovakia and Hungary themselves. We predict both countries will attempt to delay the process as much as possible and seek new loopholes, as losing cheap Russian oil would mean not only economic losses but also the collapse of their main argument about "protecting national interests."

Czech Republic

Key news to follow:

1. The Czech Republic is preparing for a change of government: will the Babiš government become a problem for Ukraine?
2. Czech President expects Babis to replace scandalous candidate for Foreign Minister


Analysis: The political theater around forming the new Czech government is taking increasingly absurd turns, though behind this chaos outlines of a possible compromise are emerging. The scandal with Filip Turek, whom the Motorists party nominated for foreign minister despite his racist, xenophobic, and openly pro-fascist social media past, looks more like part of Andrej Babiš's multi-move combination. The ANO leader's excessive "generosity" toward junior coalition partners, who received disproportionately many ministerial portfolios compared to their electoral result, raises questions about Babiš's true intentions. We assess this situation as deliberate provocation – by nominating candidates obviously unacceptable to President Petr Pavel, Babiš is creating manoeuvring space to later force SPD and the Motorists into serious concessions or limit himself to a minority government format altogether.

President Pavel's position, expecting Babiš to replace the scandalous nomination and not rushing into meetings until progress is achieved in negotiations, appears balanced and principled. The IESS believes such a firm reaction from the presidential administration could serve as a safeguard against forming an overtly anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian government. The most likely scenario remains an ANO minority government that would depend on situational support from either far-right parties on domestic issues or representatives of the previous coalition on foreign policy. Such a format, while creating some unpredictability, would still protect the Czech Republic from sharp turns toward Moscow and guarantee maintaining Ukraine support at a baseline level. However, three weeks until parliament begins work is enough time for radical changes in all sides' negotiating positions, so it's too early for conclusions.

Poland

Key news to follow:

1.Fake about "triple murder by Ukrainian in Krakow"
2. Exhibition held about "Polish Russophobia" in Moscow – a new round of information pressure
3. Sikorsky answered Szijjarto why Poland is protecting the suspect in the Nord Stream sabotage


Analysis: The information attack on Poland through the fake news about a "triple murder by a Ukrainian" in Krakow demonstrates the classic signature of the Russian disinformation machine. Using emotionally charged footage of ambulances to construct a fabricated crime, rapid spread through TikTok and Facebook with tens of thousands of reactions, accompanied by xenophobic comments – these are all elements of a proven technology for inciting inter-ethnic hostility. The IESS suggests this operation is a part of the Kremlin's large-scale campaign aimed at undermining Polish-Ukrainian relations and discrediting the Ukrainian diaspora in Polish society's eyes. Particularly alarming is how quickly such fakes gain popularity in the Polish social media segment, indicating a well-established network for their distribution and amplification.

Simultaneously, the opening in Moscow of an exhibition titled "Ten Centuries of Polish Russophobia" under the patronage of Russia's defense and culture ministries is a mirror reflection of this same strategy, but inside Russia itself. Vladimir Medinsky, known for his historical falsifications, creates a classic enemy image for domestic consumption – Poland is presented as Russia's eternal enemy, Soviet repressions are justified, and Warsaw is accused of "Russophobia" for dismantling Soviet monuments and supporting Ukraine. The Institute believes this exhibition is not merely a propaganda event but an element of preparing Russian society for possible escalation against Poland. The Kremlin is systematically building ground for new provocations, and this is happening against the backdrop of intensified information pressure directly on Polish territory. The two-sided nature of this campaign – simultaneously inside Poland and inside Russia – indicates long-term planning and the seriousness of Moscow's intentions to destabilize one of Ukraine's most consistent allies.

The conflict between Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and his Hungarian counterpart Péter Szijjártó over the Polish court's refusal to extradite a suspect in the Nord Stream sabotage reveals deep disagreements in understanding European solidarity. Szijjártó's outrage that Warsaw didn't hand over the Ukrainian to Germany and his statements about "glorifying a terrorist" look particularly hypocritical from a representative of a country that systematically blocks European sanctions against Russia and continues financing the Russian military machine through energy imports. Sikorski's response about the right to self-defense and the legitimate right to attack an aggressor's infrastructure clearly articulates a position the Institute considers absolutely justified in the context of international law. Hungary, which has de facto become Moscow's mouthpiece within the EU and NATO, has no moral right to criticize Poland for supporting Ukraine when Budapest itself continues building "special relations" with the Kremlin during a full-scale aggression against a sovereign state.