Key news to follow:
1. Bratislava openly lobbies for the removal of Putin's oligarchs from sanctions lists
2. Fico between Brussels and Moscow: why the Slovak PM is not ready to become a second Orbán
3. A letter with a request and no opposition signature: Fico appeals to Zelensky over Druzhba
Analysis:
Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár publicly confirmed at a parliamentary European affairs committee hearing on 12 March what had previously been discussed only behind closed doors: Bratislava is pushing for the removal of two Kremlin-linked oligarchs – Mikhail Fridman and Alisher Usmanov – from the EU sanctions list. Blanár framed the position in the language of "legal arguments" and "constructiveness," drawing a parallel with Slovak businessman Hambalek, who the government claims was unjustly added to the sanctions register. The opposition Progressive Slovakia asked a pointed question: what does the Slovak taxpayer gain from diplomatic efforts on behalf of individuals in Putin's inner circle? No substantive answer was forthcoming.
Running in parallel is a second story: Fico's attempt to maintain a balance between hardline anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and the real constraints that make an Orbán-style scenario unworkable for him. Following his meeting with European Commission President von der Leyen on 10 March, the prime minister claimed to have secured a principled commitment to restoring Druzhba oil transit, though the framing resembled self-promotion more than an actual breakthrough. Crucially, unlike Hungary, Slovakia did not join the unauthorised "inspection mission" to Ukraine. Instead, on 13 March, Fico published a letter to Zelensky requesting the resumption of oil transit – signed only by the ruling parties, while the entire opposition either refused or openly mocked the initiative. Members of parliament from the Slovak Movement described the prime minister as a man who "writes letters to conceal the fact that he has not secured alternative supply routes."
This configuration reveals an important fact that Fico’s foreign policy does not duplicate Orban’s Hungary, even though he plays on similar propagandistic strings. The absence of personal trust with Trump following the controversial Mar-a-Lago meeting, deteriorating economic indicators at the start of 2026, and the need for European Commission support impose real limits that the prime minister is not, for now, prepared to cross. Lobbying to lift sanctions on oligarchs and writing letters to Zelensky are instruments for consolidating his electoral base and not tools of a strategic break with Brussels. This equilibrium is fragile, however: if Orbán loses in April, Fico will lose not only an ally in vetoing EU measures, but also his protective cover.
Key news to follow:
1. Pavel strengthens in the polls – despite ongoing conflicts with the governing coalition
2. The Czech "foreign agents" bill: Babiš's coalition turns its sights on NGOs
Analysis:
A poll by the STEM analytical institute, published on 9 March, recorded a rise in support for President Petr Pavel to 57% – nearly matching his peak figures immediately after his 2023 election. This result is telling against the backdrop of a protracted conflict between the head of state and the coalition party Motorists for Themselves: Pavel twice refused to appoint Filip Turek as minister over his racist and homophobic remarks, withstood open attempts at blackmail from Foreign Minister Macinka, and showed no sign of backing down. Society is now rewarding that posture. That said, nearly half of respondents consider the president to be overstepping his constitutional role – a signal that Pavel's activism is read not only as principled, but in some quarters as excessive interference.
At the opposite end of the domestic political spectrum sits the legislative initiative presented by Babiš's coalition on 10 March: a bill requiring the registration of organisations with foreign ties. The draft would oblige individuals and legal entities engaged in public, media, educational, or analytical activity on behalf of foreign principals to register with the state. The bill's authors cite the precedents of the United States, Israel, and Australia, but critics, from Amnesty International to People in Need, point to a fundamental difference: similar mechanisms in authoritarian states have been used deliberately to stigmatise and dismantle civil society. Slovakia's Constitutional Court struck down an analogous provision last year; the EU Court struck down Hungary's. Opposition leaders draw a direct comparison to Russia's "foreign agents" legislation.
Taken together, these two stories sketch a contradictory picture of Czech democracy in 2026. A president who gains public support through principled conduct – and a government that is moving to narrow the space for independent civic activity. We assess that the conflict between Pavel and Babiš is not purely personal: it reflects a fundamental tension between two visions of the state, one held by a pro-European president and the other by a prime minister who is increasingly borrowing instruments from the illiberal playbook increasingly familiar in Central Europe.
Key news to follow:
1. A drone at a coal mine in Greater Poland: hybrid probing of Polish infrastructure
2. Warsaw takes to the streets: thousands protest the presidential veto on SAFE
Analysis:
On 12 March, an unidentified drone was discovered at a lignite mine in Halczyce, Greater Poland. The incident may yet prove routine, but it fits into an unsettling pattern: in September 2025, Russian drones flew into Polish territory en masse for the first time, prompting Warsaw to accelerate the development of a national counter-drone system without waiting for the EU's "drone wall" initiative to materialise. Polish security services remain on heightened alert, and each such episode adds weight to the arguments of those pushing for faster rearmament.
On the other hand, on 15 March, several thousand people gathered outside the Presidential Palace in Warsaw for a rally organised by the Committee for the Defence of Democracy. The trigger was President Karol Nawrocki's veto of the law on Poland's participation in the EU's SAFE programme, which would have unlocked roughly €44 billion in rearmament loans. Nawrocki, backed by the opposition Law and Justice party, put forward his own alternative – "SAFE 0%" – which would rely solely on the national budget. Prime Minister Tusk's government responded by passing a cabinet resolution on defence funding that circumvents the presidential veto. The protesters' placards: "This veto smells of Russian socks," "Enough of party games". This captures the public mood: a society that reads Nawrocki's action as the sabotage of security priorities in the service of electoral calculation.
Poland's situation this week illustrates a defining characteristic: even amid acute institutional confrontation between the president and the government, the basic strategic consensus on rearmament in Polish society remains intact – and a majority is prepared to defend it on the streets. This sets Poland markedly apart from its neighbours, where security debates are primarily driven by domestic electoral logic. IESS views Nawrocki's veto as a serious operational complication, but not a change in the country's strategic direction.