Key news to follow:
1. Slovakia can do without Russian oil and gas, it is not a matter of national security
2. Fico: “It doesn't matter whether elephants fight or have sex, the grass always suffers. No matter how the elephant talks end on August 15, the grass will suffer – in this case, it's Ukraine”.
Analysis: Slovak expert Alexander Duleba's conclusions about the country's ability to function without Russian energy carriers confirm what analysts have long known: Bratislava's energy dependence on Moscow is more a matter of political choice than technical impossibility. The 2022 experience clearly demonstrated real diversification possibilities. However, Fico's government continues using the energy issue as justification for maintaining a pro-Russian course, contradicting both Slovakia's national interests and principles of European energy solidarity.
Comparing Ukraine to "grass suffering from elephants fighting" demonstrates not just diplomatic ignorance but a fundamental distortion of Russian aggression's essence. Fico effectively strips Ukraine of agency, transforming it into a passive victim of geopolitical games. We condemn such rhetoric as unacceptable for a European leader, especially claims about the impossibility of military resolution and Ukraine's NATO membership. Most alarming is the repetition of Kremlin narratives that the West allegedly "used" Kyiv against Russia – such statements directly undermine European unity.
Slovak political discourse demonstrates deep contradictions: the expert community understands the country's real capabilities, while political leadership builds rhetoric on pro-Russian myths and outdated fears. The IESS concludes that European partners must respond more clearly to Bratislava's destructive rhetoric, as tolerating it creates a dangerous precedent for other European politicians. Long-term, this threatens EU unity and effective collective response to the Russian threat.
Key news to follow:
1. President tolerates theoretical return to cooperation with Russia "as in the past"
2. Populist Babis' party continues to lead ahead of Czech autumn elections
3. Czech far-right leader charged with inciting hatred
Analysis: President Petr Pavel's statements about possible restoration of cooperation with Russia "as in the past" indicate a dangerous evolution of the Czech position on Russian aggression. While the president formally conditions such a scenario on establishing peace in Ukraine, the very framing of the issue demonstrates readiness for a quick return to business as usual with the aggressor. Particularly alarming is his interpretation of temporary occupation of Ukrainian territories as an "acceptable price for Ukraine's survival" as a sovereign state. The Institute considers such an approach fundamentally flawed as it legitimizes territorial seizures and creates a precedent for future aggressions. The naive hope that raising living standards in Ukraine after EU accession will automatically convince residents of occupied territories ignores the realities of Russian occupation policy and years of intensive propaganda.
Meanwhile, electoral trends in Czechia demonstrate an alarming drift toward populist forces that openly oppose supporting Ukraine. The leadership of Andrej Babiš's ANO party with 34.9% support creates a real prospect of changing the country's course on the Ukrainian issue. Babiš's promises to cancel the ammunition initiative for Ukraine and stop supporting Ukrainian refugees could have catastrophic consequences not only for bilateral relations but for the entire European system of Ukraine support. We assess such positions as a direct threat to European solidarity at a critical moment of confronting Russian aggression.
Simultaneously, the rise of the far-right SPD to third place with 11.4% support signals radicalization of part of Czech society. While charges against party leader Tomio Okamura for inciting racial hatred demonstrate the effectiveness of legal mechanisms against extremism, the very fact of such political forces' popularity reveals deeper problems in Czech political discourse. Okamura's anti-immigration rhetoric often combines with anti-Ukrainian sentiments, creating a toxic mixture of xenophobia and pro-Russian sympathies.
The IESS states that Czechia is experiencing a critical moment in its political development when populist and extremist forces may gain real power and radically change the country's foreign policy course. The combination of presidential compromises regarding Russia, growing popularity of anti-Ukrainian politicians, and radicalization of part of society creates a favorable environment for Russian influence. We believe European partners must more actively support pro-Ukrainian forces in Czechia and counter the spread of destructive narratives that undermine Western unity in confronting the Russian threat.
Key news to follow:
1. How Karol Nawrocki will change Poland and what to expect for Ukraine
2. Nawrocki announced changes to the Polish constitution
Analysis: The assumption of Poland's presidency by Karol Nawrocki marks the beginning of a complex period not only for Polish domestic politics but for the entire system of European support for Ukraine. Analysis of his political profile and initial decisions allows the Institute to conclude about the formation of a new center of Euroscepticism in the very heart of Europe. Nawrocki, having strong legitimacy through electoral victory but limited political experience, demonstrates readiness for confrontation with both Donald Tusk's government and the European mainstream. His sympathies for Donald Trump and negative attitude toward the "progressive and liberal EU elite" create risks for Polish European integration at a critical moment of confronting Russian aggression.
Particularly alarming is Nawrocki's use of historical arguments to shape current international policy toward Ukraine. As a historian specializing in Polish-Ukrainian relations, the new president may transform academic discussions into political pressure tools against Kyiv. We assess such a prospect as extremely destructive, as it ignores today's geopolitical realities where Ukraine effectively defends not only its own sovereignty but the security of all Europe. Any conditions Nawrocki may impose on Kyiv regarding further assistance, even if symbolic, risk weakening the unity of the Western coalition supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile, diminishing pro-Ukrainian sentiments in Polish society create a favorable environment for exploiting anti-Ukrainian rhetoric for domestic political purposes.
Nawrocki's ambitions to create a "great Polish right-wing party" and his intentions to unite both "Law and Justice" and the far-right "Confederation" under his aegis signal possible radicalization of Polish politics. The Institute sees this as an attempt to create a powerful populist bloc capable of challenging not only Tusk's government but the foundations of Poland's European orientation. Particularly dangerous is the fact that ideologically, Nawrocki is closer to the nationalist wing of "Confederation," represented by Krzysztof Bosak, than to the traditional conservatism of "PiS." This may lead to normalization of far-right ideas in Polish political discourse.
Nawrocki's announced initiative to create a new Polish constitution by 2030 raises serious concerns about the stability of Poland's democratic system. While the president formally declares respect for the current 1997 Basic Law, the very question of its replacement amid acute political polarization creates risks for the country's constitutional order. We believe that creating a "Council for State System Change" may become an instrument for legitimizing authoritarian tendencies under the guise of democratic reforms. Experience from other European countries shows how populist leaders use constitutional reforms to concentrate power and weaken democratic institutions. The Institute warns that such initiatives amid military threats from Russia may seriously weaken Polish statehood and its ability to effectively confront external challenges.