Digest of news from Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland, September 1 - September 7, 2025

Slovakia

Key news to follow:

1. What forced the Slovak leader to change his policy towards Ukraine after meeting in Uzhhorod
2. Deputy Chairman of the ruling Slovak party Smer and Member of Parliament Tibor Gaspar compared Ukraine to Hamas and stated that Russia was provoked


Analysis: Robert Fico's dramatic pivot on Ukraine during the September 5th meeting in Uzhhorod represents a fundamental shift in European geopolitical alignments. We assess this development as the direct result of effective pressure from the Trump administration and the EU on European leaders who have maintained energy ties with Moscow. The US President's declaration to European partners about the necessity of ending Russian oil purchases marked a pivotal moment that compelled the Slovak Prime Minister to reconsider his strategy fundamentally. The participation of European Council President António Costa in the meeting only underscored the gravity of signals from both Brussels and Washington.

This evolution in Fico's position demonstrates how vulnerable European populist leaders are when faced with unified transatlantic pressure. The Slovak Premier, recognizing the threat of isolation and lacking Trump's support (unlike Orban), chose to sacrifice his alliance with the Hungarian Prime Minister to preserve his own position. It can be expected that this decision will have long-term consequences for Central European politics, as Orban now stands virtually alone in his resistance to EU sanctions against Russia and energy-related issues.

Simultaneously, statements by Fico's ally Tibor Gašpar, who compared Ukraine to Hamas and labeled Russian aggression as "provoked," reveal deep fissures within Slovakia's ruling coalition. The IESS regards such declarations as openly anti-Ukrainian propaganda that undermines EU solidarity and distorts the reality of Russian aggression. The Institute condemns this rhetoric as a betrayal of European values and international law principles that underpin the Union's consolidated position on Ukraine.

The developments surrounding Slovak political maneuvering illustrate a new phase in relations between the EU and pro-Russian forces in Central Europe. The effectiveness of combined pressure from the US and Brussels demonstrates the possibility of isolating even the most stubborn opponents of anti-Russian policies. However, parallel statements from Slovak government representatives indicate the persistence of significant Russian influence within the domestic politics of EU member states. We see the current situation as a transitional phase where formal compliance with the European line is combined with the preservation of pro-Russian sentiments at the level of political elites and society.

Czech Republic

Key news to follow:

1. The Czech government has decided to allocate more than 40 million euros annually for the reconstruction of Ukraine
2. Putin is a coward who attacks women and children in Ukraine, – Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky


Analysis: The Czech government's decision to double funding for Ukraine's reconstruction program to one billion crowns annually for the 2026-2030 period demonstrates exemplary consistency in Prague's diplomatic support for the Ukrainian cause. We assess this initiative as strategically important since it not only ensures stable funding for a five-year perspective but also creates additional opportunities for attracting EU funds through co-financing mechanisms. Minister Jan Lipavsky's statement that this program serves as "the flagship of the Czech Republic's good name in the world" reflects Prague's understanding of the importance of soft power in shaping the country's international image.

Simultaneously, the strong reaction from the Czech foreign ministry to the massive Russian attack on September 7th, when Lipavsky called Putin "a coward who attacks women and children," demonstrates Prague's readiness for open confrontation with Russian propaganda and disinformation. We regard such statements as a necessary element of information warfare, where clear moral assessments of Russian actions are no less important than material aid. The Czech position contrasts with the cautious rhetoric of some other European leaders who avoid direct characterizations of the Kremlin regime.

However, the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic create significant risks for the continued support of Ukraine. The leadership of Andrej Babiš's ANO party in polls and his promises to cancel the Czech ammunition supply initiative for Ukraine indicate a potential shift in the country's foreign policy course. The Institute assesses such declarations as dangerous populism that could undermine one of the most effective European military support initiatives for Ukraine. Babiš's position on Ukrainian refugees also raises concerns as it contradicts European principles of solidarity and humanitarian duty.

Current Czech support for Ukraine serves as a model for other European states in combining practical assistance with principled political positions. We anticipate that maintaining this course will depend on the results of autumn parliamentary elections, which could become a referendum of sorts on the Czech Republic's future role in supporting Ukraine. A potential change of government in favor of Eurosceptic forces would create a serious precedent for retreating from pan-European solidarity, especially considering the symbolic significance of Czech initiatives for smaller EU member states.
 

Poland

Key news to follow:

1. More than half of Poles oppose their country supporting Ukraine's NATO accession
2. The Polish government has prepared a new project on assistance to Ukrainians after Navrotsky's veto


Analysis: The IBRiS poll results show that over 52% of Poles oppose supporting Ukraine's NATO accession, signaling serious challenges for Polish foreign policy. We regard this as a consequence of eroding public support for the Ukrainian cause, particularly among older voters, rural residents, and those with lower education levels. The IESS notes the particular danger of this trend for transatlantic relations stability, as Poland has traditionally been one of Ukraine's most reliable allies on Euro-Atlantic integration issues. Such a shift is a result of the combined systematic Russian propaganda efforts and the massive use of Ukraine as a hatred symbol by Polish politicians. These two factors are so closely intertwined that it is often difficult to identify the original source of a particular disinformation narrative. What is evident, however, is that such an information policy pursued by Polish political forces poses a serious risk to Euro-Atlantic stability, and they would be well advised to stop before it is too late

The conflict between the Tusk government and President Karol Nawrocki regarding social assistance for Ukrainian refugees demonstrates institutional contradictions in Polish politics. The president's attempt to limit "800+" payments only to employed Ukrainians reflects a populist approach aimed at satisfying the electoral sentiments of part of Polish society. We condemn such initiatives as a dangerous precedent of refugee discrimination that contradicts European standards for protecting displaced persons and may provoke similar measures in other EU countries.

Polish policy toward Ukraine is experiencing a phase of internal contradictions between rational governmental approaches and populist sentiments, both in society and the presidential palace. We anticipate further escalation of these contradictions, especially in the context of approaching electoral campaigns. The rise of anti-Ukrainian sentiments among a part of the Polish electorate creates serious risks for long-term support of Ukraine, which could have strategic consequences for the entire European security system. The Institute calls on Polish leadership for more active work in shaping public opinion and countering disinformation that undermines solidarity with the Ukrainian people and Polish national security.