Key news to follow:
1. Joint case: Orban dreams of creating an anti-Ukrainian alliance in the EU together with Slovakia and the Czech Republic
2. The EU proposes to deprive Slovakia of voting rights due to constitutional changes
3. Joint case: US expects Hungary and Slovakia to ‘wean off’ Russian energy, says NATO envoy
Analysis: Balazs Orban's talk of building an anti-Ukrainian bloc matters less for what it reveals than for what it attempts: classic Orban posturing, casting Hungary as the leader of an alliance that doesn't actually exist to boost Budapest's standing. His vision of coordinating Budapest, Bratislava, and Prague before EU summits recalls the Visegrad Four's migration crisis tactics, but ignores crucial differences on the ground. Fico has blocked Ukraine support repeatedly, yet Slovakia acting alone doesn't make a coalition. More importantly, placing the Czech Republic in this supposed axis fundamentally misunderstands where Prague stands – even Babiš's incoming government hasn't embraced Fico-style cooperation with Kremlin interests. What we're seeing is Orban trying to create a coalition story for Hungarian audiences and for bargaining power in Brussels. The genuine worry isn't that this bloc exists – it genuinely doesn't – but that Budapest's persistent messaging could make it real if left unchallenged.
The Netherlands' consideration of activating Article 7 against Slovakia appears as a belated but necessary reaction to Bratislava's constitutional changes. Formally, this concerns violations of LGBT+ rights and the primacy of national law over EU legislation, but the issue runs much deeper: Slovakia is testing the limits of permissible deviation from European values, backed by Hungarian experience. The Venice Commission warned, the European Commission expressed concern, and now The Hague is considering real sanctions – this gradual escalation scenario demonstrates how difficult it is for Brussels to respond to a member state consciously drifting toward authoritarianism. The problem is that the Article 7 procedure requires unanimity to impose sanctions, and Hungary will certainly block any decisions against its ideological ally. The Netherlands understands this, so the real goal of the initiative is not to deprive Bratislava of voting rights but to create political pressure and publicly record that certain member states have crossed a red line.
US NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker's statement about expecting concrete plans from Hungary and Slovakia to abandon Russian energy adds another dimension of pressure, but realism forces everyone to admit: Fico and Orban view energy dependence on Moscow not as a vulnerability to be eliminated but as an instrument for preserving autonomy from Brussels and Washington.
Key news to follow:
1.The Czech government wants to impose sanctions on the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the country, Babiš supports
2. The Czech Foreign Ministry reminds Russian diplomats who really backed fascism
Analysis: Babiš's support for sanctions against Metropolitan Hilarion appears at first glance as an encouraging signal, but closer analysis reveals a tactic typical of the future premier: demonstrating toughness on issues that carry minimal political risk while preserving freedom to maneuver where it truly matters. Sanctions against a clergyman with obvious ties to Russian intelligence services are a safe position that costs nothing electorally but allows deflecting criticism regarding pro-Putin sympathies. Babiš formally agreed but simultaneously shifted responsibility to Fiala's current government, remaining in the comfortable position of observer. This is classic double-standard politics: tactical toughness toward the Russian Orthodox Church does not contradict the strategic course of curtailing military aid to Ukraine and rhetoric about "diplomatic settlement" with Moscow. The real test will be not the attitude toward Hilarion but whether Babiš's government maintains the Czech ammunition initiative and support for the Ukrainian defense industry, and here forecasts are far less optimistic.
The Czech Foreign Ministry's sharp response to another Kremlin propaganda distortion about "British fascism" demonstrates one of the few encouraging trends: the Czech diplomatic service retains institutional memory and is prepared to publicly remind of historical facts even when political leadership drifts in another direction. The mention of the Soviet-Nazi parade in Brest and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is not merely a historical reference but a conscious emphasis that European institutions are still capable of resisting Russian manipulation of history. However, the troubling signal remains that such sharp statements come from Fiala's outgoing government, while Babiš's future cabinet is unlikely to maintain similar rhetorical toughness. Volunteer initiatives like "Gift for Putin" and the government decision to build a satellite for Ukraine show that Czech society still contains a powerful pro-Ukrainian segment, but IESS states that the political will of the new leadership to implement this support raises justified doubts.
Key news to follow:
1. Polish fighter jets intercept another Russian aircraft
2. Poland detains two more Ukrainians on suspicion of espionage
Analysis: Regular interceptions by Polish fighters of Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea have become the new routine for NATO's eastern flank, but behind this routine lies Moscow's systemic strategy: testing response times, studying procedures, and creating habituation to constant provocations. When a Russian Il-20 flies with its transponder off without a filed flight plan, this is not a mistake or negligence – it is a conscious tactic of creating situations where each subsequent incident provokes slightly less reaction until the boundaries of the permissible shift so much that a genuine airspace violation might be perceived as another "provocation." Warsaw understands this logic better than most Western capitals, responding consistently and publicly – not only intercepting aircraft but also publicizing information about each incident. General Grinkevich's statement that NATO's decisive response forced Russia to act more cautiously confirms the correctness of the Polish approach: the only language the Kremlin understands is demonstration of readiness to respond to any provocation immediately and openly.
The detention of another two Ukrainians suspected of espionage for Russian intelligence services reveals the most painful aspect of Russian hybrid warfare: using citizens of the victim country of aggression for sabotage operations against an ally of that victim. Poland demonstrates the professionalism of its intelligence services by detecting and detaining agent networks, but each such case damages Ukrainian-Polish relations at the level of public trust, which is precisely Moscow's goal. Eight detained in various parts of Poland and Romania indicate not isolated cases but a coordinated network collecting information about military infrastructure related to Ukraine support. Minister Siemoniak's statement about the intensification of sabotage activities should be perceived as a warning: Russia is preparing not only for further provocations but for possible escalation, where Ukrainian citizens, recruited or bribed by Russian intelligence services, will perform the role of saboteurs. The Institute considers it critically important that the Ukrainian side not perceive these detentions as anti-Ukrainian actions by Warsaw but understand them as part of a common struggle against Russian aggression – precisely such an interpretation will avoid the split that Moscow expects.