Key news to follow:
1. Tusk called the first signals from Russia regarding the ceasefire proposal unsatisfactory.
2. An alternative for Poland: how an anti-Ukrainian politician got a chance to become president.
Analysis: The Kremlin response to the American armistice offer did not surprise Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who reacted with characteristic diplomatic directness. Calling the Russian response "unsatisfactory to put it mildly," Tusk confirmed what had already become apparent after the negotiations in Saudi Arabia – the distinction between those who sincerely seek peace and those who wish to continue the war. It is significant that despite the skepticism about Moscow's readiness for compromise, the Polish leader expressed restrained hope for the success of the US-Europe-Ukraine diplomatic tandem. This position is consistent with Warsaw's strategic sequence, which preserves the role of one of Kyiv's most principled allies in confronting Russian aggression.
In parallel, we are witnessing an alarming trend within Poland – the rapid growth in popularity of Sławomir Mentzen and his Confederation party on the eve of the presidential election. Although the candidate from the ruling "Civil Coalition" Rafal Trzaskowski remains the leader of the race with 35% support, Menzen shows a dynamic increase in ratings, ahead of the candidate from "Law and Justice" Karol Navrotsky in some polls. The Mentzen phenomenon is a local manifestation of the pan-European trend of growth of right-populist forces observed from Berlin to Paris. Its success is based on a unique combination of ultra-liberal economic views with nationalist rhetoric, which allows attracting both young voters and those who are disillusioned with traditional political forces.
Particular attention is drawn to the anti-Ukrainian component of Mentzen's rhetoric, which deliberately exploits the ressentiment of a part of Polish society regarding the presence of Ukrainians. His provocative visit to Lviv to record a video at the Bandera monument, statements about "culturally Polish Lviv" and accusing Ukrainians of excessive use of social assistance are all elements of a well-calculated strategy. It is noteworthy that, unlike other European populists, Mentzen avoids an open pro-Russian position, even calling Russia a threat and Putin a criminal. However, his proposal to "stay away from Ukraine and Russia" and opposition to increasing defense spending objectively meet the interests of Moscow, which seeks to isolate Ukraine.
Analyzing the existing trends, IESS predicts an increase in tension in Ukrainian-Polish relations in proportion to the strengthening of Mentzen's positions in the Polish political landscape. At the same time, we should not exaggerate the threats - the fundamental foundations of the strategic partnership between our countries remain strong. The common understanding of the existential Russian threat, the unprecedented integration of Ukrainians into Polish society, and the deep economic interdependence create a powerful counterweight to populist narratives. The Ukrainian government should focus on active communication with a wide range of Polish political forces, demonstrating transparency in the use of Polish assistance and the development of economic relations, which will ensure consistency of support even in the face of possible political transformations in Warsaw. A pragmatic approach to cooperation while avoiding historical discussions will keep the pace of strategic rapprochement of our countries, despite the turbulence of the election cycle.
Key news to follow:
1. Czech Republic`s politicians welcome proposal for "30-day truce".
2. The party of the pro-Russian former prime minister of the Czech Republic has lost some of its popularity.
Analysis: The Czech diplomatic reaction to the results of the US-Ukrainian negotiations in Saudi Arabia demonstrates the sequence of official Prague's support to Ukraine. The statements by Foreign Minister Jan Lipavski and Interior Minister Vit Rakushan on the "30-day truce" reflect the strategic vision of the Czech Republic – combining diplomatic efforts with firm support for Ukraine in the face of prolonged and bloody Russian aggression. Lipavsky aptly emphasized the dual significance of the Jeddah negotiations: both a step towards a just peace and a mechanism to curb further escalation. In this context, it is noteworthy to synchronize the statements of Czech government officials with the Ukrainian position - in Prague, as in Kyiv, they emphasize that we are not talking about "freezing the conflict." We believe that such a clear position of the Czech Republic confirms its role as one of the most consistent allies of Ukraine in Central Europe, a country where diplomatic pragmatism is organically combined with principle in security issues.
In parallel with this, the internal political dynamics in the Czech Republic cause some concern about the prospects for further support of Ukraine. The ANO movement of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, despite a slight drop in the rating, retains the lead with 33.7% of support, which is almost twice the rating of the ruling Spolu bloc (17.3%). This indicates a high probability of a change of power in the parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn 2025. Of particular concern is the ANO's previous statement about its readiness to "cancel the initiative to supply hundreds of thousands of artillery shells to Ukraine" if it returns to power. Such a position could significantly undermine Ukraine's military capability and adversely affect Czech-Ukrainian relations.
Significantly, the political spectrum of the Czech Republic demonstrates fragmentation and strengthening of the extreme flanks. In addition to ANO, the far-right "Freedom and Direct Democracy" (8.9%), the extreme left of the party "Enough!" (5.9%), and the populist movement "Motorists for Themselves" (5.3%). These political forces are united by criticism of the current economic policy of the government and the use of socioeconomic discontent of citizens. Indicative in this context is the direct correlation between "economic fatigue" and the potential weakening of support for Ukraine.
We predict a possible cooling of Czech-Ukrainian relations in the event of a change of power in Prague in the fall of 2025. However, we believe that the depth of these changes will be limited for several reasons. Firstly, the powerful civil society of the Czech Republic and the memory of the historical experience of the Soviet occupation create a public demand for countering Russian imperialism. Secondly, the institutional consolidation of support for Ukraine in the structures of NATO and the EU, of which the Czech Republic is a member, reduces the opportunities for a radical change of course. Thirdly, the pragmatic interests of the Czech defense industry, which received a significant incentive for development thanks to orders for Ukraine, create economic incentives for continued cooperation.
Thus, the Ukrainian side should focus on expanding ties not only with the current government but also with a wide range of Czech political forces, including the opposition. Particular attention should be paid to demonstrating the economic benefits of bilateral cooperation and the more active involvement of Czech businesses in the reconstruction of Ukraine. This will make support towards Ukraine a pragmatic interest of the Czech economy and will help maintain the stability of relations despite possible political changes. Paradoxically, it is the emphasis on the pragmatic dimension of relations that may prove to be the most effective strategy in dealing with a potential ANO government focused primarily on economic issues.
Key news to follow:
1. Fico decided to say that he supports "all peace plans" for Ukraine.
2. Oil supplies to Slovakia resumed via the Druzhba pipeline.
Analysis: The resumption of Russian oil supplies to Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline once again underlines the vulnerability of the energy infrastructure of the Central European region and the potential directions for manipulating energy supplies in the zone of the ongoing conflict. Of particular note is the rhetoric of Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto, who hastened to accuse Ukraine of attacking a drone at an oil pipeline measuring station. Such a statement, without proper verification of the facts and despite the lack of official confirmation, reveals an attempt to use the incident to discredit the Ukrainian side. IESS notes that the infrastructural interweaving of energy routes of Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic creates the basis for a common problem - dependence on Russian energy carriers. Increased attention to such incidents indicates nervousness in the region to ensure energy security, especially given the continued supply of Russian oil despite the military actions and EU sanctions.
In parallel with energy issues, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico's statement about supporting "all peace plans" and "all peace proposals for a ceasefire in Ukraine" drew attention. It's no wonder that this universal declaration appeared immediately after the news of the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire based on the results of Saudi negotiations, but did not contain a direct reference to this particular initiative. The rhetoric of the Slovak PM is characterized by deliberate blurring and appeal to emotional arguments about the "mutual murder of the Slavs." Fico's emphasis on "a sovereign Slovak foreign policy focused on all four sides of the world" is, in fact, an euphemism for distancing himself from the common position of the EU and NATO, to which Slovakia belongs, and demonstrates his shaky strategy of balancing between the West and Moscow. However, the point of support for the balance still gravitates towards the Kremlin and its propaganda rhetoric against the West and Ukraine, the echoes of which can very often be heard in the statements of the ruling circle of Slovakia.
The current Slovak-Ukrainian relations are nearly the most problematic among the Central European countries. Unlike Poland and the Czech Republic, which maintain consistent support for Ukraine, Slovakia, under the leadership of the Fico government, is steadily moving towards a position that objectively serves the interests of Russia. Of particular concern is a combination of two factors: energy dependence on Russian supplies and political rhetoric that avoids a clear definition of the aggressor. This position creates the basis for Bratislava's gradual drift towards reconciliation with Russian interests, which can be manifested in the inhibition of new EU sanctions packages, blocking military assistance to Ukraine, and strengthening pro-Russian narratives in public discourse.
At the same time, the IESS notes that Fico's ability to radically change course is limited by the institutional framework of EU and NATO membership. The example of Hungary, which, despite the pro-Russian rhetoric, remains within the overall strategy of the Alliance and the European Union, demonstrates the limits of such maneuvering. It is critically important for Ukraine to maintain communication with various political forces in Slovakia, especially with the opposition, which keeps a pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western position. The strategic direction should be working with civil society and the business community, for which exclusion from Euro-Atlantic processes poses economic risks. In addition, it is necessary to form an unambiguous position on energy incidents related to the Druzhba pipeline in order to deprive opponents of the opportunity to manipulate this topic. Despite the difficulties, relations with Bratislava remain an important element of the Eastern European security architecture, and their degradation must be contained by all available diplomatic means.