Digest of news from Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, March 3-9, 2025

Poland

Key news to follow:

1. Polish PM: Strong Ukraine means safer Poland, opposition to this aids Putin's triumph
2. Duda: Europe is absolutely not ready for war.

Analysis: To be vigilant on the eastern borders is not paranoia, but common sense, when an imperial disease rages in the neighborhood. And in this, Warsaw has long been ahead of most European capitals, many of which still can not eliminate illusions about the possibility of "finding the common ground" with the Kremlin.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's statement about a sovereign Ukraine as a guarantee of a stronger and safer Poland is a reflection of Warsaw's consistent strategic position. In his post on the X social network, Tusk emphasized the geopolitical logic that connects Ukraine's independence with the security of Poland, while indirectly criticizing those political players who undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. Such rhetoric from the head of the Polish government signals the desire to maintain support for Ukraine despite the internal political contradictions in Poland and some tension in bilateral relations, especially in the context of trade contradictions. Noteworthy is the categorical wording by which Tusk actually identifies any doubts about supporting Ukraine with concessions in favor of Moscow, which indicates an even more convincing attempt to consolidate the Polish political elite around a pro-Ukrainian position.

Another appeal, already by Polish President Andrzej Duda to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, demanding to increase the defense spending of the Alliance countries to 3% of GDP, reflects Warsaw's growing concern about Russian aggression, which has no borders. Referring to the experience of Poland, which already spends almost 5% of GDP on defense, Duda focuses on Europe's unpreparedness for a full-scale conflict, as evidenced by the lack of sufficient stocks of weapons and ammunition at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Particularly alarming in the Polish president's statement is the warning that without proper military deterrence, Putin could decide to attack other countries after Ukraine. The persistence with which Duda promotes the issue of increasing NATO's defense spending at the upcoming summit in The Hague illustrates Poland's attempts to assume the role of leader in security issues on the eastern flank of the Alliance.

We see recent statements by Polish officials as a sign of the formation of a new paradigm of Polish-Ukrainian relations, where the security dimension finally dominates historical contradictions or economic conflicts. There is a consensus between the President and Prime Minister of Poland, despite their belonging to different political camps, about the strategic importance of Ukraine for the security not only of Poland but of the whole region. This creates a favorable background for overcoming the current differences between Kyiv and Warsaw in the field of trade in agricultural products and matters of historical memory.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Ukrainian government could more effectively use this favorable context for more proactive diplomacy with Poland, in particular on joint defense initiatives and regional security projects. IESS predicts that if the clear anti-Russian position of both countries is maintained, Ukrainian-Polish relations will tend to deepen the strategic partnership, especially in the military-technical sphere and in matters of joint opposition to Russian expansion. Such cooperation can become the foundation for the formation of a regional security bloc with the involvement of the Baltic countries and other states of Central and Eastern Europe.
 

Czech Republic

Key news to follow:

1. Czech Prime Minister: Trump's decision highlights the need to change Europe's current policy.
2. The Czech government approves an increase in defense spending to 3% of GDP by 2030.

Analysis: The Czech Republic is confidently moving along a new path of strategic maturity, transforming its historical experience into a balanced security policy and demonstrating its readiness to back up its position not only with declarations but also with specific financial obligations, defense investments, and practical assistance to partners.

The words of Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala regarding the need for a fundamental change in European policy in response to the decision of US President Donald Trump to suspend assistance to Ukraine are indicative of a rethinking of the European approach to regional security. Fiala touched on the pain point of European geopolitics, emphasizing that the time for relying on external security guarantors has actually passed. His call for strengthening economic and military capabilities and increased support for Ukraine points to the formation of a new security paradigm in Central Europe, where the Czech Republic is trying to take the position of one of the regional leaders. It is important to emphasize that support for Ukraine is not seen as a humanitarian gesture, but as a pragmatic tool to ensure the security of the Czech Republic itself and Europe as a whole.

The decision of the Czech government to gradually increase defense spending to 3% of GDP by 2030 confirms the seriousness of Prague's intentions to implement the declared ambitions in practice. It is noteworthy that Fiala called such an indicator "the necessary minimum," leaving room for an even more ambitious increase in the defense budget. A clear progressive timetable for spending increases - 0.2% each year from 2026 - demonstrates a thoughtful approach that allows the economy to adapt to new realities. Fiala's categorical statement that "Russia threatens us" points to the crystallization of the anti-Russian consensus in the Czech political elite and the desire to overcome historical pro-Russian sentiments in part of Czech society.

In our opinion, the intensification of the Czech position on helping Ukraine and increasing its defense capabilities opens a window of opportunity for deepening Ukrainian-Czech relations in the military-technical sphere. Prague, which initiated a large-scale initiative to supply artillery ammunition for Ukraine, demonstrates a desire to play the role of coordinator of regional efforts to support Kyiv. A parallel vector for the modernization of Ukraine’s armed forces creates a promising market for the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, in particular in the fields of armored vehicles and electronic warfare, where our enterprises have important competencies confirmed by combat experience.

We believe that the Ukrainian side should intensify the dialogue with the Czech Republic not only at the level of defense cooperation but also on the coordination of positions at the EU and NATO sites. The Czech government's changing rhetoric about Europe's responsibility for its security points to Prague's potential willingness to support ambitious initiatives to accelerate Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. We predict further development of Ukrainian-Czech relations towards the formation of a strategic alliance, which will become an important link in the creation of a regional security space from the Baltic to the Black Seas, capable of effectively countering Russian expansionist ambitions even if the American presence in the region decreases.
 

Slovakia

Key news to follow:

1. Slovakia expects Ukraine to resume gas transit as a "gesture of gratitude".
2. Fico ally sees no issue with "Russians being in Kyiv".
3. Slovaks take to the streets in new protests against Fico's pro-Russian policies.

Analysis: A real drama is unfolding in Slovak politics – a country that several years ago was confidently moving along the European path is now at a crossroads between the Euro-Atlantic community and the Kremlin's orbit, and its society is showing increasing signs of a split in basic values ​ ​ and strategic guidelines.

The statement of the President of Slovakia Peter Pellegrini on the "gesture of gratitude" in the form of the resumption of the transit of Russian gas through the territory of Ukraine is a vivid example of the pragmatic approach of the current Slovak authorities to bilateral relations. The rhetoric of the president, which actually causes further support for Ukraine by restoring gas transit, reflects a turn in Bratislava's foreign policy after the change of power. It is especially noteworthy that Pellegrini publicly justifies the "harsh rhetoric" of Prime Minister Fico, referring to the protection of the "national interests of Slovakia." This position demonstrates a significant deviation from the solidary European line on energy dependence on Russia and points to Bratislava's attempts to use the issue of assistance to Ukraine as a lever for achieving its economic benefits. At the same time, the reaction of the presidents of the Czech Republic and Austria to the Slovak position indicates the risk of isolation of Slovakia in the regional context.

The scandalous statement by the vice president of the ruling Smer-SD party, MEP Eric Kaliniak, that the Russian occupation of Kyiv would make Russia a "reliable neighbor" for Slovakia is unprecedented in its frankness and indicates the depth of pro-Russian sentiments in the country's ruling elite. The narrative of Russia as a "more reliable partner" than Ukraine reflects not only Kaliniak's personal position but also the established discourse of a significant part of the Slovak establishment. This statement can be seen as a logical continuation of the Fico government's policy of terminating support for Ukraine and rapprochement with Moscow. The reaction of the opposition party "Progressive Slovakia," which characterizes such statements as "betrayal," emphasizes the deep internal political differences in the country regarding geopolitical orientation.

Mass protests against the pro-Russian policy of the government of Robert Fico, which covered more than 40 cities of Slovakia, show significant public resistance to the course of the current government. Slogans "Slovakia is Europe" and condemnation of contacts between Smer-SD politicians and high-ranking Russian officials indicate that a significant part of Slovak society does not share the anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian rhetoric of the authorities. Particularly acute to the protests is the outrage over the meeting of party member Fico Lubosh Blakha with the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation Sergey Naryshkin and his statements about the "victory of Russia." Such a deep polarization of Slovak society creates the basis for internal political instability.

Analyzing the existing trends, we predict further deterioration of Ukrainian-Slovak relations given the consolidation of the anti-Ukrainian position in the government circles of Bratislava. Slovakia's refusal of military assistance to Ukraine, criticism of sanctions against Russia, and promises to block Ukraine's accession to NATO form long-term negative dynamics in bilateral relations. For Ukraine, this means the need to revise the strategy of interaction with Slovakia, in particular in matters of energy cooperation and transit.

We consider it expedient for the Ukrainian government to develop parallel channels of communication with the Slovak opposition and civil society, which demonstrate a pro-European and pro-Ukrainian position. At the same time, it is appropriate to consider the possibility of diversifying regional partnerships and strengthening cooperation with Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic countries to compensate for the loss of support from Slovakia. The positive aspect is that the position of the current Slovak government is increasingly perceived as marginal in the context of pan-European policy, which may limit its destructive impact on Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.